Dawn Editorials (with Summary and Vocabulary)

 DAWN EDITORIALS

January 21, 2024 (Sunday)

Day’s Vocabulary

• Implicated.           show (someone) to be involved in a crime
• Faltered.     start to lose strength or momentum
• Accentuates.         make more noticeable or prominent
• Entrenched.          (of an attitude, habit, or belief) firmly established and difficult or unlikely to change; ingrained
• Bizarre.       very strange or unusual, especially so as to cause interest or amusement
• Inexplicable.        unable to be explained or accounted for
• Nemesis.     the inescapable agent of someone's or something's downfall
• Tenor.          the general meaning, sense, or content of something
• Detractors.            a person who disparages someone or something
• Conceded.  admit that something is true or valid after first denying or resisting it
• Ecstatic.      feeling or expressing overwhelming happiness or joyful excitement
• Conciliatory.        intended or likely to placate or pacify
• Watered-down.  diluted with water
• Stymied.     prevent or hinder the progress of
• Teeming.    full of people or things; crowded
• Misogyny.  dislike of, contempt for, or ingrained prejudice against women
• Innocuous.            not harmful or offensive
• Antisemitic.          hostile to or prejudiced against Jewish people
• Trifecta.      a bet in which the person betting forecasts the first three finishers in a race in the correct order.
• Bastions.    an institution, place, or person strongly defending or upholding particular principles, attitudes, or activities
• Upped.         cause (a level or amount) to be increased
• Ante. a stake put up by a player in poker and similar games before receiving cards
• Kool Aid.     a powder that is added to water or another liquid to make a fruit-flavored soft drink
• Dispensation.      a system of order, government, or organization of a nation, community, etc., especially as existing at a particular time
• Statutory.  required, permitted, or enacted by statute

Justice and politics

Summary

• Justice for victims of police brutality is rare in Pakistan.
• The killers of Sarfraz Shah, who was shot by paramilitary forces in 2011, were only denied a presidential pardon after a lengthy trial and appeals process.
• Rao Anwar, a police officer accused of killing over 400 people in fake encounters, was acquitted in the high-profile Naqibullah murder case.
• Police officers involved in the Sahiwal tragedy, where a family was mistakenly killed by the Counter Terrorism Department, were also acquitted.
• The system protects officials in law-enforcement agencies (LEAs), even when they abuse their power.
• Lower-ranking officials are often scapegoated in police brutality cases, while those in higher positions are rarely held accountable.
• LEAs justify unlawful actions and demand immunity and rewards.
• Legal loopholes and judicial leniency often shield them from consequences.
• The lack of accountability for LEAs has led to a culture of violence.
• Reports of LEAs indiscriminately killing innocent civilians surface regularly across Pakistan.
• This culture of violence is enabled by the flawed political, social, and justice systems.
• State institutions are reluctant to engage with families of missing persons from Balochistan.
• They fear that the issue of the missing persons is complicated and could damage their reputation.
• They have instead opted for counterproductive tactics, such as establishing "victims of terrorism" camps nearby.
• Rights movements can evolve into political forces when justice is denied or delayed.
• The Haq Do Tehreek in Gwadar is an example of this.
• The Baloch missing persons' movement is also evolving into a political force.
• The judiciary has a crucial role to play in preventing LEAs from abusing their power.

Article

After a lengthy trial in an anti-terrorism court, followed by the rejection of appeals from superior courts, the killers of Sarfraz Shah, who was shot by paramilitary forces in 2011, finally appealed to the president of Pakistan for a pardon under Article 45 of the Constitution. When the President’s House denied their appeal in 2018, it was a significant step towards restoring the confidence of ordinary citizens in the existing justice system. In a similar incident in 2020, the arrest of a Frontier Corps soldier for the killing of a university student in Turbat, Balochistan, proved to be a significant confidence-building measure between the local populace and the security forces. However, such examples remain rare in Pakistan’s legal and judicial landscape.

Last year, on Jan 23, a dark day unfolded when Rao Anwar, a police officer accused of killing over 400 people in fake encounters, was acquitted in the high-profile Naqibullah murder case. This case had significantly impacted the political landscape of Pakhtun-dominated regions, and the army chief at that time had personally assured justice for the victim’s family. Adding to the irony, the Sitara-i-Shujaat was awarded to a police officer from Punjab who was implicated in the Sahiwal tragedy. This tragedy occurred in January 2019, when the Counter Terrorism Department mistakenly killed a family travelling to a wedding ceremony, suspecting them of being terrorists. The court eventually acquitted all the accused officials.

A lot has been written on these four cases from the legal and human rights perspective, but academic curiosity has no limits. These cases expose the power dynamics of how power corrupts officials in law-enforcement agencies (LEAs), how low-ranking and high-ranking officials alike misuse their authority, and how the system protects them.

Sarfraz Shah’s case is a rare example of justice done. Perhaps the reason was that the culprits had little defence. Sarfaraz, a 22-year-old man who went out for a walk in a public park in Karachi, was killed by Rangers, and a camera captured the entire scene. This began an era of social media activism and vigilant citizenry. Civil society played a vital role in bringing justice to the victim’s family.

Rights movements can evolve into political forces when justice is denied or delayed.

The killing of university student Hayat Baloch in Turbat, amidst volatile security and rising political grievances in Makran, sparked the birth of the Haq Do Tehreek in Gwadar. Security forces took a different approach in this case, arresting a Frontier Corps soldier. A wise move, this arrest proved a major confidence-building measure and prompted a dialogue between security leaders and communities, particularly youth. This led to administrative changes, including relaxed security checks and expanded border markets along the Iran border. However, the initiative faltered as local grievances resurfaced, fuelled by the provincial counterterrorism department’s excessive resort to extrajudicial practices. This further accentuates the ongoing sit-in camp for missing persons in Islamabad, led by courageous Baloch women.

The lower ranks are often scapegoats in police brutality cases, and are sacrificed by LEAs to appease public anger while maintaining their impunity. This pattern persists despite high-profile incidents such as the killings of Sarfraz Shah and Hayat Baloch, demonstrating the lack of accountability within law enforcement.

Across Pakistan, reports of LEAs indiscriminately killing innocent civilians surface regularly — from Karachi to Islamabad and from Gwa­­dar to Quetta. This entrenched culture of violence is enabled by the flawed political, social and justice systems, which continue to support figures like Rao Anwar and the late Chaudhry Aslam, notorious for their extrajudicial practices.

Ironically, LEAs justify such unlawful actions and demand both immunity and rewards. Even when caught, legal loopholes and judicial leniency, as seen in the Sahiwal tragedy, often shield them from consequences. The anti-terrorism narrative conveniently allows LEAs to sweep these incidents under the rug, with no real accountability within the civilian, security and judicial systems. An audit of recent ‘police encounters’ would likely expose a staggering number of injustices, a fact the system is unwilling to confront.

If the state institutions had been vigilant enough, they would have recognised the advantage of engaging with the families of missing persons from Balochistan who are protesting in Islamabad. A dialogue with them would have been more effective, but the institutions fear that the issue of the missing persons is complicated and could damage their reputation. Apparently, not only the state institutions but also political parties are convinced that publicly sympathising with these families will come at a cost, and they are deliberately trying to distance themselves from the protesters. The mainstream parties, betting on the establishment’s support in the upcoming election, and even Baloch nationalist parties, are reluctant to extend their full support to the victims’ families.

State institutions’ reluctance to engage with Baloch families and their counterproductive tactic of establishing ‘victims of terrorism’ camps nearby are backfiring. Though the Baloch missing persons’ movement initially focused solely on the rule of law, state institutions, political parties, and their media allies have framed it as a potential PTM-like threat in Balochistan. This narrative threatens not only the status quo, but also Baloch nationalist parties who have not adapted to the changing aspirations of Baloch society.

The Haq Do Tehreek’s political foothold in Gwadar demonstrates that rights movements can evolve into political forces when justice is denied or delayed. This transformation is not a choice but a necessity; they recognise that power responds to power, and political participation becomes the path to achieving their goals.

The rights movements challenging the status quo and demanding transparency in actions of state institutions have often faced a harsh response. Instead of engaging in dialogue and addressing concerns, state institutions have opted for coercive measures, pushing the movements towards more confrontational tactics. A charged protest atmosphere can create the perfect environment for law enforcement to abuse their power. The judiciary alone can prevent LEAs from exploiting the ambiguity inherent in such confrontational situations.

Missiles no threat to polls, but…

Summary

• Iran and Pakistan exchanged missiles, targeting Baloch camps on each other's side of the border.
• The exchange was brief and quickly de-escalated, with both sides returning to talk of "brotherly relations".
• The author speculates that Iran's attack may have been motivated by a desire to assert the IRGC's status as the top military force in Iran.
• Pakistan's response was likely motivated by a need to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as to demonstrate its military strength in the face of criticism of the security establishment.
• The author criticizes Pakistani political parties for their lack of focus on important issues, such as the Baloch rights issue and the threat posed by the TTP and separatists in Balochistan.
• He also criticizes the parties for their lack of transparency and their focus on staying in the good books of the establishment, rather than on serving the interests of the people.
• He concludes by saying that the people seem to be marginal to the whole electoral process, and that the parties are more focused on making tall promises than on delivering on them.

Article

Iran and Pakistan exchanged missiles, presumably fired by drones, aimed at Baloch ‘camps’ either side of the border this week, before quickly signalling de-escalation and returning to talk of ‘brotherly relations’.

As bizarre and pointless as the exchange initiated by Iran appeared, the rapidity of the de-escalation appeared equally inexplicable, as diplomats quickly took over the discourse from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Pakistani military, both of whom held centre stage briefly and spoke through their weapons.

A whole piece would be needed to explore Iran’s rationale for its missile attack, targeting a camp of the militant group Jaish al-Adl which is said to be engaged in an armed conflict with the Iranian state. IRGC operations have much to do with asserting its status as the top military force in Iran. Once its attack happened, a Pakistani response in kind was always on the cards.

There were many compulsions, and the first obvious, official one was that the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty had been breached and violated violently. Therefore, a response had to come to tell one and all the consequences of attacking Pakistan.

With elections round the corner, which party’s manifesto has inspired confidence?

If one were to look at other factors that weren’t being mentioned by the country’s media, the foremost appeared to be the need to spotlight the defence forces’ capacity to respond to any threat posed by external powers against the backdrop of criticism of the security establishment for its political engineering.

In brief, the domestic factor was not an insignificant one, particularly with social media accounts belonging to one particular political party, whose turn it is to be on the receiving end of the wrath of the powers that be, mocking their nemesis and questioning the latter’s ability to respond militarily.

Little wonder Pakistan’s response was egged on and supported by several TV personalities known to have close ties with the establishment. One can safely say their tone and tenor would have been much different had the decision been not to retaliate, for example. In any case, some credit was earned by the military leadership, as even their usual detractors conceded the development as having had a positive impact on their ‘popularity’ ratings.

That Pakistan remains a complex story to tell for journalists like me was demonstrated by some other media personalities who appeared ecstatic that the missile attack would potentially derail elections, as ‘this national security challenge’ needed to be addressed urgently, setting aside all other national priorities. Whose view were they articulating? The caretakers?

However, the speed of de-escalation, which started with a conciliatory statement by the foreign ministry in Tehran and followed through by diplomats meeting and exchanging direct messages, poured cold water over the dreams of the ‘election postponement’ camp.

This camp’s wishful thinking was strange anyway after the Supreme Court endorsed the ECP decision to deprive the PTI of its electoral symbol, while overturning the Peshawar High Court verdict on the matter. It should have been clear to all that one of the last obstacles to an establishment-controlled ‘reset to 2016’ election had been removed.

That decision seems to have convinced the political parties, most notably the PML-N, that elections will indeed be held in under three weeks’ time and that, in turn, they needed to gear up their mass contact campaigns to win, even if their main opponent was fighting with their hands tied.

Despite recent doubts, mainly on account of the ‘democratic’ Western nations’ response to the Gaza genocide, I have long believed that even a watered-down democratic order is better than autocratic rule, as the former affords some openness and a semblance at least of basic rights. Call me naïve, if you will.

In Pakistan, all political parties without exception have justifiably blamed the establishment for interfering in the decision-making process and eventually ending up undermining the very order that, in instances, it helped put in place. They also need to do some serious soul-searching.

With elections round the corner, which party’s manifesto has inspired confidence in you? That is, if you have been fortunate enough to have seen one. I haven’t. The main contender to the Islamabad and Lahore thrones says its manifesto will likely be made public on Jan 27. Yes, the PML-N will make public its pledges to the people a mere 13 days before the polling day.

Earlier this month, the PPP came up with a 10-point programme that can best be called a wish list, with no costing as to how it will ‘double’ salaries, build three million homes, give free up to 300 electricity units to the poor, etc, etc. Reminded one of the PTI’s 5m homes pledge in 2018.

There can be no doubt the establishment has constantly stymied democracy in the country but with such sketchy plans (or none at all), surely the political parties also hand over the initiative elsewhere. For example, no party has said a word about how it will resolve the burning Baloch rights issues or the physical threat being posed to our soldiers and civilians alike by the TTP and separatists in Balochistan.

With the exception of the out-of-favour party, for now, all others appear focused on staying in the good books of those who are managing the ‘reset to 2016’ process. Their worry isn’t whether an exchange of missiles with Iran may derail the elections. Their only concern is to stay on the right side of those they think matter.

The people, the teeming millions, who should be at the heart of any democracy, seem marginal to the whole process. All is well, of course, as long as they show up at the jalsas and on Feb 8 to vote for those who seem to be making tall promises in their speeches but appear short on details of how they will deliver.

Beyond headlines

Summary

• Harvard's first Black president, Claudine Gay, resigned following a smear campaign led by conservative activists.
• The campaign against Gay was motivated by her support for DEI initiatives and her refusal to condemn pro-Palestinian student demonstrations.
• Accusations of plagiarism against Gay were amplified after a Congressional hearing failed to produce the desired results.
• The media's focus on Gay's resignation has distracted from coverage of Israel's war on Palestine.
• The author believes that the tide is turning against elite interests and that a new audience is emerging that is less reliant on traditional media outlets.

Article

You can’t get all your news from headlines. I was reminded of this last month in the US, when reading stories about Harvard president Claudine Gay’s resignation following allegations of plagiarism. In reality, her resignation was the result of a well-coordinated campaign which had to do more with race and misogyny than upholding academic principles. But you wouldn’t think so reading the headlines.

This campaign to oust the first Black president at Harvard was led by conservative activist Christopher Rufo, who is against DEI (diversity equity inclusion initiatives) and Bill Ackman, Harvard alum and hedge fund billionaire. They were then joined by donors and Republican Elise Stefanik, who headed a Congressional committee looking into accusations of antisemitism on elite campuses. Essentially, they were enraged by Gay’s “failure” to condemn antisemitism; ie, pro-Palestinian student demonstrations on Harvard.

“Does calling for the genocide of Jews violate Harvard’s rules of bullying and harassment?” asked Stefanik, who herself is a Harvard alum and was removed from an advisory board after she said the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump.

“The rules around bullying and harassment are quite specific,” replied Gay, “and if the context in which that language is used amounts to bullying and harassment, then we take — we take action against it.”

Innocuous thinking can be framed as antisemitic in the US.

The backlash to Gay’s response was swift and calls for her to be removed were amplified. (Incidentally all three universities called to the hearing were headed by women, and only the MIT president still has her job.)

However, there was little mention of how, in those hearings, Stefanik was framing protest to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land as genocide. At one point, Stefanik described the “call for intifada as a call to commit genocide against the Jewish people”. Even a basic internet search will show that intifadas have not called for eliminating Jewish people. But it was clear no one in the press wanted to make this distinction, perhaps fearing it would be seen as antisemitic. Unfortunately, the most innocuous or seemingly obvious thinking can be framed as antisemitic in the US.

Gay didn’t stand a chance.

When the hearings weren’t able to produce the desired results, her detractors amplified the accusations of plagiarism. An investigation by Harvard into those claims found “few incidents of inadequate citations” but no wrongdoing. In reality, the right-wing (read rich men) cannot tolerate a Black woman in charge of an institute whose history is rooted in protecting white interests.

Gay resigned on Jan 2, but the trifecta of Ackman, Rufo and Stefanik — as MSNBC’s Ali Velshi called them — has vowed to pursue probes into “deep institutional rot” at Harvard. I read this as protecting elite interests, one of which they say is freedom of speech on campuses. But whose speech do they want to protect?

US colleges have never been bastions of free speech because Palestinians, and other marginalised voices, have struggled to tell their stories. However, this is changing as DEI initiatives have allowed new perspectives, and younger generations no longer accept mainstream media narratives, especially about genocide. The establishment continues to bully them into silence, but I don’t know how much longer for.

Advocates of free speech are often the ones who suppress the most marginalised voices. These are usually the same people against DEI initiatives which, they claim, is the only reason Gay got the job. Men like Ackman, with access to formidable resources, are now trying to equate DEI initiatives as racist and/ or antisemitic. On the other side are Palestinians and their supporters with far fewer resources but with truth on their side.

The media’s focus on Gay’s ‘plagiarism’ should remind us how easy it is to distract from coverage on Palestine. I’m not here to say that Gay’s story isn’t important, but surely there’s space in newspapers about Israel’s war that is now starving Palestinians. It is also a reminder of how elitist the media is — more keen to talk about palace intrigues at Harvard than starvation in Gaza because that’s what its audience wants. This serves politicians like Stefanik well because they don’t have to answer questions about their Israel policies. The media aids them in this.

The interest in Gay’s future or Harvard’s policies will wane when journalists, editors and media owners realise they can’t just serve elite interests. The tide is turning, albeit slowly, and the resistance to this change is immense. The Israel lobby has upped the ante on keeping its narrative alive, but a new audience is emerging that isn’t buying their Kool Aid anymore. This number will grow and won’t rely on the media for information. They’re already on TikTok; how long before everyone else is too?

Security decisions

Summary

• Pakistan has a history of struggling to maintain a National Security Council (NSC).
• There is no consensus in Pakistan about the role of an NSC. Civilian leaders worry it gives the military too much power, while others argue it could strengthen civilian governments.
• Pakistan faces serious security challenges, including border issues with India and Afghanistan, and rising terrorism.
• The author believes Pakistan needs a fully empowered NSC, chaired by the prime minister, and an NSA to address these challenges effectively.
• The US and India have both successfully used NSCs to coordinate national security decision-making.

Article

Nearly every country facing the kind of security challenges that Pakistan confronts maintains a national security council (NSC) as a principal decision-making body that brings together the civil and military leadership onto one platform. However, in Pakistan, this idea has not been fully embraced.

Gen Ayub Khan constituted a national advisory council to give the impression of collective decision-making by the civil and military leadership. In 1969, Gen Yahya Khan established an NSC for advice. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto constituted a cabinet committee on national security in 1976. Gen Zia also created an NSC in 1985 but abolished it the same year. In 1997, the interim government of Malik Meraj Khalid established a council for defence and national security to aid the government but the idea was abandoned by the elected dispensation, which preferred the forum of a defence committee of the cabinet.

In October 1998, Gen Jehangir Karamat floated the idea of an NSC for institutionalised decision-making on national security. However, the suggestion was resisted by the Sharif government on grounds that it would give constitutional legitimacy to the army’s role in political governance. Gen Musharraf revived the idea in 2004 and set up an NSC as a statutory body, which worked till 2008. In 2013, prime minister Nawaz Sharif softened up to the idea but reconstituted it as a national security committee (not council), subservient to the cabinet.

Evidently, the idea of having an NSC could never take root in Pakistan. The story is no different when it comes to the office of national security adviser. Pakistan had NSAs in 1969, 2004 to 2008, and then 2013 to 2022. Since April 2022, there has been no NSA.

There is no consensus in Pakistan about the role of an NSC.

Clearly, there is no consensus in Pakistan about the powers and role of an NSC. Civilian rulers perceive it as a forum to give the military a greater say in political governance, which, they believe, undermines the mandate of elected governments.

A counter argument is given that since an NSC is chaired by the prime minister and includes several leading cabinet members, involving the military leadership in decision-making on critical issues of national security could strengthen, rather than weaken, the hands of the civilian government. Further, given our ground realities, a high-level civil-military forum for collective decision-making could address misunderstandings before these morph into military interventions.

Given the enormous geostrategic changes underway globally and regionally, and instability on our borders with Iran, Afghanistan and India, Pakistan needs an NSC to address security challenges. It is worth noting that national security is now defined more comprehensively as a tripod of traditional security, economic security and human security. Given the interconnected and wider spectrum of threats to national security — external, internal and non-traditional — a whole-of-the-nation approach is needed.

It would also be relevant to look at how the rest of the world is managing decision-making on issues of national security. In the US, the NSC was created in 1947 as the president’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters. It is chaired by the president and its regular attendees include the vice president, secretaries of defence, state, treasury and homeland, chairman joint chiefs of staff and director of national intelligence. It has become the president’s principal arm for coordinating between domestic and foreign policies and across federal agencies. Time has shown that this forum has enabled the president to make informed policy decisions.

In our own neighbourhood, India’s prime minister Vajpayee established an NSC in November 1998, six months after the South Asia nuclear tests, and one month after Gen Karamat had proposed the idea in Pakistan. Since then, India’s NSC has functioned regularly on all matters relating to the external and internal security of India, with key union ministers and military leaders in attendance. Five NSAs (three with diplomacy and two with intelligence background) have served the country. The NSC has a three-tiered structure, comprising a strategic policy group, an advisory board, and a joint intelligence committee.

Pakistan can learn from these and several other examples where national security interests have been better served by institutionalised decision-making. Given that we have border security issues with our neighbours to the east and west, and with the forces of terrorism raising their head again, the next elected government needs to consider setting up a fully empowered NSC, chaired by the prime minister, and also appoint an NSA, so that serious challenges to Pakistan’s national security can be addressed collectively and more effectively.