Dawn Editorials (with Summary and Vocabulary)

 

DAWN EDITORIALS

January 22, 2024 (Monday)

Day’s Vocabulary

• Perverse.    (of a person or their actions) showing a deliberate and obstinate desire to behave in a way that is unreasonable or unacceptable, often in spite of the consequences
• Upended.    set or turned on its end or upside down
• Fraying.      (of a fabric, rope, or cord) unravel or become worn at the edge, typically through constant rubbing
• Quash.         reject or void, especially by legal procedure
• Modicum.  a small quantity of a particular thing, especially something considered desirable or valuable
• Gerrymandering.           the manipulation of an electoral constituency's boundaries so as to favor one party or class
• Sticking point.    an obstacle to progress toward an agreement or goal
• Fraught.      (of a situation or course of action) filled with or likely to result in (something undesirable)
• Testy.           easily irritated; impatient and somewhat bad-tempered
• Gamut.        the complete range or scope of something
• Brazen.        bold and without shame
• Thaw.           (of ice, snow, or another frozen substance, such as food) become liquid or soft as a result of warming
• Strewn.       scatter or spread (things) untidily over a surface or area

‘Managing polls’

Summary

• Corruption and elections are closely linked in the year 2024, especially in Pakistan where it is seen as necessary for maintaining political stability.
• Despite the orchestration of elections, signs suggest that the tactic of managing corruption may be weakening.
• Corruption in the electoral process includes not only bribery but also the abuse of state resources, manipulation of court rulings, media gagging, and strategic deployment of security forces.
• The concept of 'buying the peace' is discussed, relating it to post-conflict situations where stakeholders benefit from the system, but the public is historically sidelined.
• With economic and climate crises, resources for patronage are scarce, leading to increasing public grievances and protests across the country.
• Old tactics of managing corruption are becoming less effective, and a transition to inclusive democracy is necessary for Pakistan to move forward.
• Despite perceptions of corruption, a 2016 study suggests that voter turnout is not significantly affected, but the long-term consequences should be considered.

Article

The year 2024 is the year of elections. That means it’s also the year of corruption. Around the world, corruption and elections go hand in hand, with research showing that corruption soars in the run-up to polls. In Pakistan, electoral corruption is perceived as necessary to maintaining a perverse form of political stability; a way of ‘managing’ democracy to ensure that the institutional status quo is not upended. Despite the orchestration of this year’s election, there are signs this tactic may be fraying.

Narratives of corruption are inevitably tied up with Pakistan’s electoral process. One candidate is cleared of corruption charges, seemingly to come to power, another faces corruption charges to quash his political potential. Ironically, the perversion of justice, intimidation and censorship required to manage the corruption status of political actors are themselves a form of corruption, executed in the name of eradicating that very evil.

In fragile states like ours, corruption is not only the means to an end, but is also believed to contribute to some modicum of ongoing stability. Back-channel corruption in the run-up to elections is a form of consensus-building around one candidate, and is widespread to ensure there are no challenges to the carefully brokered power equation extending across law enforcement, the judiciary, bureaucracy, ‘electables’, the business community, etc.

To be clear, corruption does not take the form of bribery only, though our electoral history is littered with suitcases stuffed with cash. As Transparency International puts it, corruption also includes the abuse or manipulation of state resources, which includes court rulings and electoral policies that favour certain candidates, gerrymandering, vote-buying in the context of patronage politics, media gagging, strategic deployment of security forces on election day, and so on.

Corruption does not only take the form of bribery.

It is a familiar story. But it is helpful to go further and recast electoral corruption in the context of ‘buying the peace’. Peace buying typically occurs in post-conflict situations; for example, after civil wars. In these contexts, peace builders (global institutions and NGOs) buy off violent actors (ethnic militias, organised criminal groups) in exchange for ending the conflict. This can be through outright payment or through soft agreements about which groups can control certain resources (think of ministries being handed to different factions in a post-conflict scenario). This tactic was used by the US in Afghanistan, with that country’s ethno-linguistic groups plundering different state coffers and diverting development aid while Washington turned a blind eye.

For earnest peace builders, a bought peace is at best a short-term arrangement during a transition period, with hopes of ultimately shifting incentives and normalising democratic practice. The tactic fails when stakeholders perceive they are not benefiting equally. Those grievances descend into conflict because the affected group has lost the incentive to remain non-violent.

Applying this frame to Pakistan’s poll landscape is helpful. For decades, electoral corruption has worked because all elite stakeholders have benefited from the system. Even those who lose out in one election bide their time knowing they will enjoy favours the next time polling occurs.

But one key stakeholder has historically been sidelined in these negotiations: the public. At most, they are seen as recipients of patronage — transactional service delivery in exchange for complicity — doled out in the form of subsidies, patchy infrastructure development, tolerance for tax evasion. How­ever, in times of economic and climate crises, resources for distribution through patronage are incr­e­asingly scare. Cor­ru­ption is breeding competition, not consensus; grievances are mounting.

We can see this in protests across the country: Baloch women demanding the return of their disappeared loved ones, hundreds demanding wheat subsidies in Gilgit-Baltistan, traders protesting in Chaman, fisherfolk rising against Chinese trawlers along the coastline, farmers unionising in Okara, city dwellers burning soaring electricity bills on the streets. It is getting harder to buy the peace now that the public is demanding its share.

It is only by recognising that old tactics cannot work and genuinely transitioning to inclusive democracy that Pakistan can move forward. It seems elections will take place this year, and all is likely to go to plan. A 2016 study by Stefan Dahlberg and Maria Solevid found that voter turnout is not materially affected by perceptions of corruption, particularly where vote-buying is rampant. The day after polls, it may seem as if all is in control, the status quo well preserved. But we should all beware what comes after.

Al Shabaab threat

Summary

• Al Shabaab:
• Al Qaeda's East African branch, active in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia.
• Fighting Somali government and African Union since 2007.
• Responsible for numerous attacks, including Nairobi's Westgate Mall and Garissa University attacks.
• Aims to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state in East Africa.
• History and Ideology:
• Formed from a hard-line splinter group of Al-Itihad al-Islami.
• Opposes democracy and recruits youth online and from Somalia/Kenya.
• Utilizes children as fighters and leverages Somali nationalism and Sunni sect affiliation.
• Activities and Funding:
• Collects taxes, constructs dispensaries, and enforces strict social rules in controlled areas.
• Funded by Somali diaspora, charcoal exports (until 2012 UN ban), investments, and various fees/extortion.
• Second-deadliest terror group globally in 2022, responsible for 97% of terror-related deaths in Somalia.
• Challenges and Future:
• 17-year war against Al Shabaab suggests kinetic solutions alone are insufficient.
• Somali government needs to explore peaceful options, including negotiations, but Al Shabaab's willingness to talk remains unclear.

Article

Al Shabaab (‘the youth’) is Al Qaeda’s subsidiary in East Africa. It is active in much of southern Somalia and a few pockets in Kenya and Ethiopia. Since 2007, Al Shabaab has been fighting the Somali government and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia. It is believed to be responsible for a surge in attacks since the 2022 re-election of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who has declared an “all-out war” on Al-Shabaab.

Al-Itihad al-Islami, Al-Shabaab’s predecessor, was the incubator for many of its leaders. A younger, hard-line group later split from the elder AIAI, wanting to establish a ‘Greater Somalia’ ruled under the Sharia. This younger group joined forces with the Islamic Courts Union. In 2006, US-backed Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia and pushed the ICU out of the capital. The majority of ICU fighters fled to neighbouring countries, but others retreated southwards, re-emerging later as a guerrilla group against the Ethiopian forces and seizing territory in central and southern Somalia. By 2008, Al Shabaab had grown from a small-sized group to an organisation of about 9,000.

Al Shabaab developed ties with Al Qaeda in 2008, but formally pledged allegiance in 2012. Onwards, it carried out a few high-profile violent attacks in Somalia’s neighbouring countries, including the September 2013 Westgate Mall attacks in Nairobi, in which 68 people were killed, and the Garissa University attack in April 2015, resulting in 148 deaths. In October 2017, Al Shabaab carried out another deadly truck attack on the busiest intersection of Mogadishu, resulting in 587 deaths. Owing to its capability for lethal attacks, it has been described by the media as the deadliest terror group in Africa.

Al Shabaab dreams of a fundamentalist Islamic state which would include Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia. According to its narrative, democracy is a religion for non-Muslims, hence it must be opposed and rejected. It recruits online and attracts youth from Somalia and Kenya. In 2017, the UN secretary general stated that over half of Al Shabaab’s fighters may be children, reflecting the group’s strategy to replace ageing fighters with younger ‘talent’. It is to Al Shabaab’s benefit that the majority of fighters are ethnic Somali and from the Sunni sect, which lets it take advantage of both Somalia’s nationalism and religion.

The war against the militant group has dragged on for 17 years.

Its pledge of allegiance brought Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al Shabaab closer. The US became their common enemy. Proximity to Al Qaeda provided an opportunity for Al Shabaab to be trained in Afghanistan. Some master trainers moved to Somalia and trained Al Shabaab fighters. Both collaborated on matters ranging from indoctrination and basic infantry skills, to making IEDs, conducting suicide bombings, taking hostages, and assassinations. During this partnership, Al Shabaab also developed skills to use laptop explosives and car bombs.

The group collects tax on transport vehicles and constructs dispensaries in areas under its control. To prove it is environment-friendly, plastic bags have been banned. It encourages feedback from citizens by placing complaint boxes outside offices to improve administration within its controlled areas. By distributing food, banning drugs, and reducing crime, the group tries to project itself as a welfare organisation to win public trust. Listening to music or shaving beards is also prohibited in areas under its control.

Since its inception, Al Shabaab has been dependent on multiple sources of funding, which includes support from the Somali diaspora. After seizing the port city of Kismayo in 2008, the group earned a hefty amount from exports of charcoal. To dry up this source of income, the UN banned charcoal exports from Somalia in 2012. Reportedly, Al Shabaab also made its expenditure from investments in gold. According to the UN, Al Shabaab has generated up to $100 million a year from different sources, including fees levied at ports of entry, taxes on goods, checkpoint fees, and extortion.

According to the Global Terrorism Index 2022, 315 attacks that resulted in 784 deaths made Al Shabaab the second-deadliest group in the world. The deaths attributed to it in Somalia increased by 23 per cent, and the highest proportion of its attacks were directed against the military, followed by civilians. Al Shabaab was held responsible for 97pc (733 deaths) of all terror-related deaths in 2022.

The war against Al Shabaab has dragged on for 17 years. History and ground realities suggest that it cannot be defeated with kinetic options alone. The Somali government needs to explore peaceful options, including negotiations; but the real question is whether Al Shabaab is interested in talks.

Challenging agenda

Summary

1. Complex Foreign Policy Challenges:

• Pakistan faces a tense regional situation with strained relations with Iran, India, and Afghanistan.
• The next government must navigate these complex challenges while also addressing domestic issues.

2. Iran:

• Recent airstrikes on both sides escalated tensions, pushing relations to a historic low.
• De-escalation occurred, but the relationship remains damaged.

3. Global Context:

• Avoiding entanglement in the US-China confrontation is crucial.
• Balancing ties with China (priority) and the US (important trade partner) will be complex.

4. India:

• Normalizing relations remains difficult due to India's actions in Kashmir and refusal to discuss the dispute.
• Managing tensions and preventing escalation are immediate priorities.

5. Afghanistan:

• The Taliban's inaction against Pakistani militants strains relations.
• Pakistan seeks a solution between cooperation and avoiding a breakdown in relations.

6. Domestic Matters:

• Pakistan's internal stability and economic strength are crucial for effective foreign policy.

Article

Foreign policy challenges for the next government have become even more complex after Pakistan and Iran traded airstrikes last week. Relations between the two neighbours have been uneasy even at the best of times. The presence of armed groups on both sides of the border has long been a sticking point.

But the Iranian air strike against a militant group inside Pakistani territory sparked unprecedented tensions and evoked a strong response from Islamabad. A Foreign Office statement condemned the “unprovoked violation of its airspace” and warned of “serious consequences.” Iran’s action drove relations to a historic low, compelling Islamabad to retaliate by conducting military strikes against militant targets in Iran.

This flare-up in tensions could not have come at a worse time, when Islamabad’s relations with its other two neighbours remain deeply troubled. Pakistan’s regional security concerns have shown little sign of easing in recent years. Relations with India remain frozen, with frequent eruption of tensions along the Line of Control in Kashmir.

Pakistan’s ties with Afghanistan under the Taliban have become increasingly fraught and testy. Having long sought to prevent a two-front scenario of hot borders with its neighbours, Islamabad now has to deal with this very security challenge. Despite the de-escalation in Iran-Pakistan tensions, the relationship has been damaged.

The next government will have its hands full on the foreign policy front, apart from dealing with multiple domestic challenges, especially the ongoing economic crisis. The range of foreign policy issues it will have to address makes it necessary to undertake a wide-ranging review of the entire gamut of foreign policy. Holding envoys conferences is not the same thing.

With global power shifts underway in an unsettled, multipolar world, characterised by mounting geopolitical tensions and a fraying international order, there is urgent need for the managers of Pakistan’s foreign policy to assess this big picture and take stock. Without a broad review and understanding of linkages between various policy areas, Islamabad will be unable to effectively navigate the complex international and regional geopolitical terrain.

At the global level, the key challenge would be to avoid getting into the crosshairs of US-China confrontation, the overarching global dynamic today. Much rhetoric is heard from Pakistani officials about balancing relations between two global powers. That’s declaratory policy.

The reality is that China is Pakistan’s overriding priority, with a solid economic dimension now augmenting long-standing strategic ties. Having stood the test of time, the relationship meets both Pakistan’s security and economic interests. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is the pivot of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, whose timely progress requires close coordination and addressing Beijing’s security concerns in this regard.

The next government faces an array of imposing foreign policy issues.

With the US, relations have been in flux since the American military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. This diminished Pakistan’s importance in Washington’s eyes, because, for two decades, Afghanistan was the principal basis for the relationship, which was largely shorn of bilateral content and marked by both close cooperation and deep mistrust.

The challenge for the next government is to find a new basis for ties, forge a stable relationship with Washington, and be prepared to deal with a possible Trump presidency. The US remains Pakistan’s largest export destination, a source of FDI and a global power with significant influence, especially over international financial institutions, whose assistance Pakistan’s crisis-prone economy constantly needs.

Complicating a reset in ties is Washington’s top strategic priority of containing China. As Pakistan cannot be part of any anti-China coalition, this limits the space for Pakistan-US relations. As does Washington’s growing strategic and economic relationship with India, its partner of choice in the region in its strategy to project India as a counterweight to China.

The implications for Pakistan of the US-India partnership are apparent from Washington turning a blind eye to Delhi’s illegal actions in occupied Kashmir and its augmentation of India’s military capabilities. The latter has aggravated the regional strategic imbalance and magnified Pakistan’s security dilemma. The challenge, then, is to find space between the Pakistan-China strategic relationship and US-India entente to rebuild ties for mutual benefit. There are certainly areas of cooperation to explore to reconfigure ties.

Managing the troubled relationship with India will arguably be the most vexing foreign policy challenge. Relations were ruptured when India illegally annexed Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, and absorbed it into the Indian Union in brazen violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Formal dialogue was suspended by Delhi even earlier, and trade, too, was halted.

New irritants emerged, including disagreement over the Indus Waters Treaty dispute settlement mechanism. Against this backdrop, the question is whether a fresh start is still possible if Nawaz Sharif returns to power and Narendra Modi is re-elected, given their past relationship which produced a thaw in ties.

The path to normalisation of relations, however, remains strewn with formidable challenges given Delhi’s actions in occupied Kashmir and refusal to even talk to Islamabad about the dispute. It would be difficult for Pakistan to take steps to normalise ties if Delhi rules out discussion of the issue and claims all it will talk about is for Pakistan to vacate Azad Kashmir.

As normalisation may not be a near-term possibility, Islamabad and Delhi should focus on managing tensions and consider how to put in place an agreed framework to manage tensions in order to prevent them spinning out of control.

Dealing with Afghanistan will also preoccupy the next government at a time when relations have hit a new low because of the Taliban’s unwillingness to act against the terrorist group, Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, which continues to carry out cross-border attacks from its Afghan sanctuaries.

Endless rounds of talks between the two neighbours have yielded little, forcing Islamabad to adopt a tougher stance towards Kabul. There are, however, limits to a coercive approach, as Pakistan would not want a breakdown in relations. This leaves it with a difficult policy dilemma in dealing with Kabul.

There are other foreign policy challenges too, which the government will have to deal with. But it is Pakistan’s domestic trajectory — how competently it governs itself and builds a strong economy — that will determine the effectiveness of its foreign policy. All foreign policy, after all, begins at home.

The wind vs the people?

Summary

• The Supreme Court's decision to strip PTI of its electoral symbol is seen as regressive, compromising the pre-election phase and undermining voter rights.
• The pre-election phase was already perceived as unfair, with a crackdown on workers and candidates hindering a fair campaign.
• Recent polling suggests a narrowing gap between PTI and PML-N in Punjab, with PTI's lead reduced to two points.
• The closing popularity gap for PML-N is attributed to the concept of 'hawa,' indicating the perception of establishment support rather than tangible improvements or a strong political narrative.
• The 'hawa' involves the alignment of undecided voting blocs based on the expectation that a party supported by the establishment will form the next government.
• Middlemen play a crucial role in mobilizing vote blocs in rural and peri-urban constituencies, with field observers noting support consolidation behind PML-N candidates.
• PTI's chances in the election depend on timely communication of candidate identities, narrative-based mobilization through social media, and a concerted effort for higher turnout, especially in central Punjab.
• The evolving landscape with unknown variables like newly registered voters, social media influence, and party identity growth may impact the election differently than in 2018.

Article

The Supreme Court’s decision stripping PTI of its electoral symbol casts another shadow on an already compromised pre-election phase.

It undermines the rights of voters to vote for their preferred party by making the task of candidate identification considerably more difficult. By all accounts, it is a regressive decision which deepens Pakistan’s ongoing derailment of democracy.

Even prior to the decision, no impartial observer would have considered the pre-election phase as fair or ‘level’. The crackdown on workers and candidates already prevents a serious election campaign from being mounted by one party.

However, prior to the Supreme Court decision, there was a distinct possibility that the anonymity of the ballot box, along with clear candidacies in all constituencies, would allow for a proper electoral contest. That prospect, arguably, now stands irrevocably diminished.

Recent polling by Gallup Pakistan shows that PML-N has closed both the voting intention gap and the leadership favourability gap in the all-important province of Punjab. PTI now carries just a two-point lead over the PML-N, narrowing down by 19 points since March 2023. The breakdown shows a near-even split in party preference across central, south, and west Punjab, with PTI commanding a large intention lead in north Punjab, which has 15 of the province’s 141 seats.

Translating sample-based voting intention surveys that cover large regions into constituency-based outcomes is a tricky task. Support bases for parties can be spread out unevenly. Small opinion poll differences can still lead to large differences in seats won based on where party supporters are located. However, this rapid closing of the gap needs to be explained.

In a lopsided playing field such as this one, what chance does an out-of-favour party have?

Conventionally, parties can gain popularity if their time in office leads to material improvements, or their political narrative resonates with the population. The former is unlikely to be the case for the PML-N in the present. Energy and food inflation is still running rampant, and the unprecedented cost of living crisis that it presided over as part of the PDM coalition government is fresh in the memory of poor and middle-class households.

Similarly, the party does not have much of a political narrative of defiance or democratic rights at the moment, either. That ship sailed after the same-page reboot of the last 20 or so months.

Political observers across rural and peri-urban Punjab, instead, indicate that the closing of the popularity gap may have more to do with age-old ‘hawa’; ie, perception of establishment support, rather than any other factor.

The ‘hawa’ is a frequently cited, though under-theorised aspect of Punjab’s electoral politics. At its simplest, it means the en masse alignment of undecided or unaligned voting blocs towards a party based on the expectation that it will be able to form the next government.

This expectation is usually, though not always, tied to the idea that clear-cut backing of the establishment is enough to see a party over the finish line in some form or the other. In 2013, the ‘hawa’ worked on the expectation that the establishment would not prevent an already popular party from forming the government. This allowed N to sweep Punjab at a scale greater than what many initially expected.

The core societal form behind the ‘hawa’ are voting blocs in rural and peri-urban constituencies. As documented by Punjab scholars and observers for decades, parties and their candidates rely on middlemen to mobilise blocs of voters, rather than relying exclusively on direct, mass party connections.

These vote blocs can be along the lines of caste/ biraderi, or village/neighbourhood associations, and are kept afloat through thana-katcheri access and piecemeal provision of basic infrastructure and services. Crucially, these blocs are how turnout is managed on election day.

The importance of such middlemen rises and falls depending on the wider political context. In some elections, such as 2008, the national mood may be sufficient to sway voters, regardless of which way the wind is perceived to be blowing. But even then, their role in shaping turnout remains instrumental.

The indication coming from field observers over the past couple of weeks is that these integral middlemen are consolidating support behind seasoned PML-N candidates. Direct and costly party-to-voter contact is absent.

Instead, their candidates are busy meeting local blocs and offering favours and public works projects as enticements. This is taking place alongside a continued crackdown on PTI candidates, who are being prevented from holding similar meetings.

In a lopsided playing field such as this one, what chance does an out-of-favour party have? In other words, does the ‘hawa’ make the result a foregone conclusion?

I would wager that despite all efforts of ‘curation’, ballot box dynamics always offer a sizable chance for throwing up surprises. In 2002, an incumbent (now court-certified) military dictator oversaw elections, in which blessings were showered on a hand-picked king’s party. Yet, the regime needed extensive polling day rigging, and significant floor crossing in the post-election phase, to produce an extremely thin majority in the National Assembly.

In the current context, a close contest would need three things from the PTI: timely communication of candidate identities, the narrative-based mobilisation of unattached, party voters through social media, and a concerted election-day push for a higher turnout, especially in central Punjab.

The last one in particular is key because lower turnout (through disillusionment or voter suppression) is likely to favour those parties that bring voters out through middlemen-led blocs.

These elections are not taking place in 2002. The list of unknown variables — newly registered voters, social media influence, strength of and growth in party identity — is extensive. Such variables were in comparative infancy in 2018. And they may yet have a larger impact on this particular election.