Dawn Editorials (with Summary and Vocabulary)

 

DAWN EDITORIALS

February 4, 2024 (Sunday)

Day’s Vocabulary

  • Incarceration.     the state of being confined in prison; imprisonment
  • Plausible.   (of an argument or statement) seeming reasonable or probable
  • Ebbing.        (of an emotion or quality) gradually lessen or reduce
  • Vigour.        physical strength and good health
  • Vitiate.        spoil or impair the quality or efficiency of
  • Travails.     engage in painful or laborious effort
  • Stalwarts.  a loyal, reliable, and hardworking supporter or participant in an organization or team
  • Pandering. gratify or indulge (an immoral or distasteful desire, need, or habit or a person with such a desire, etc.)
  • Acquiesce.  accept something without protest

Taliban’s declining influence

Summary

Pakistan's Elections 2024:

  • Taliban's influence on voters seems to be declining compared to 2002 elections, despite concerns.
  • Elections will be a test of public sentiment towards the Taliban, especially in Pashtun-dominated areas.
  • TTP actions might have damaged the Taliban's image in Pakistan, impacting religious parties' support.
  • Economic issues and sympathy for Imran Khan might influence voters more than ideology.

Religious Parties and the Taliban:

  • JUI-F could benefit due to ties with Taliban and potential ceasefire with TTP.
  • This involvement might come at a cost, strengthening pro-Taliban elements in border regions.
  • Reconciliation with TTP is risky as past attempts led to regrouping and increased threat.

Other Concerns:

  • Taliban seen as a desirable Islamic state model by some, impacting Pakistan's stability.
  • Religious narratives opposing state policies can be used as political tools, distracting institutions.

Article

A POSITIVE development for Pakistan’s upcoming general elections on Thursday is the declining influence of the Afghan Taliban as a source of inspiration for voters. This starkly contrasts with the 2002 elections, where a pro-Taliban religious alliance secured record votes, particularly in Balochistan and KP. Back then, the Taliban’s recent overthrow by the US-led coalition stirred sympathy votes. Conversely, with the Taliban now ruling Afghanistan, concerns arose about a similar pro-Taliban wave in the 2024 elections. However, initial indications suggest the Taliban’s appeal has diminished in Pakistan, although a deeper analysis is still needed.

The upcoming elections in Pakistan are a crucial test of public sentiment regarding the Taliban’s influence. The election results, particularly in the Pakhtun-dominated areas, will provide valuable insights into the evolving dynamics of power and ideology in Pakistan.

Despite the Afghan Taliban’s diminished influence, their support for the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains unabated. JUI-F leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s recent visit to Afghanistan to secure an unannounced ceasefire during the elections has, apparently, yet to yield results. Therefore, another critical aspect of the elections will be gauging the extent to which the TTP’s actions have damaged the Taliban’s image and their influence in Pakistan. While JUI-F may garner votes from its strongholds in Balochistan and KP, a significant decline in overall support for the religious parties would suggest a negative perception of the Taliban due to the actions of the TTP. A low turnout in these areas traditionally associated with the Taliban and TTP influence would signal public disapproval of their activities.

While the JUI-F might benefit from established support in some constituencies, it is crucial to recognise its potential role as a tool by the Pakistani establishment to counter the PTI in KP. It is worth noting that the 2002 general election saw the religious parties’ alliance Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal win due to Gen Pervez Musharraf’s strategy of marginalising major parties like the PPP and PML-N. While the MMA touted their victory as a success of religious unity, they failed to replicate it in subsequent elections. The JUI-F’s and Jamaat-i-Islami’s attempts to position themselves as anti-establishment also failed to win the public’s trust. This ultimately led Maulana Fazlur Rehman to realign himself with the establishment.

One aspect of the polls will be to gauge how much TTP actions have damaged the Taliban’s image.

The alliance between the religious parties and the establishment is widely recognised and enduring despite the complexities in their relationship. In the 2018 general elections, the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) was utilised (in Punjab), in a manner similar to the MMA in 2002. With over two million votes secured in the previous election, the new leader faces the challenge of maintaining the party’s voter base.

Elections have long been held in a controlled environment, with the establishment often ensuring its desired outcome. However, the 2024 elections occur in a more tightly controlled context due to the country’s political turmoil and economic crisis. In this scenario, voters in Punjab, KP, and urban Sindh may prioritise issues such as inflation, price hikes, and unemployment over traditional ideological or ethnic considerations. General sympathy towards Imran Khan and PTI may also influence their choices.

A few political pundits forecast that the TLP would be used again for electoral engineering. However, it would be risky for the PML-N and pro-establishment parties, as they have failed to dent the PTI vote bank. The TLP can prove counterproductive for them as it holds more lethal narratives against the PML-N and its allies.

Religiously motivated groups openly oppose electoral processes and democratic principles. Recent statements condemning elections and threats to political leaders highlight this challenge. Religious political parties face pressure to denounce groups like the TTP and IS-K and counter their narratives online and in communities. However, concerns about safety often lead to silence, which can embolden these groups. While their direct impact on voter participation remains unclear, these militants continue influencing public perceptions and potentially expanding their reach. A recent report by a UN monitoring team suggests the TTP established a new base in KP in mid-2023, where individuals trained as suicide bombers were reportedly located.

Among the religious political parties, the JUI-F could potentially benefit significantly. Besides their internal political dynamics, their ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and direct contacts with the TTP make them valuable for the establishment. Recent reports suggest Maulana Fazlur Rehman brokered a temporary ceasefire with the TTP during his visit to Afghanistan, facilitated by the Haqqani Network. This ceasefire coincided with a decrease in claimed terrorist attacks in Pakistan. However, some factions within the TTP remain dissatisfied and continue to launch attacks.

If these reports are accurate and the JUI-F secures enough seats in the elections, the party could become crucial in back-channel negotiations with the Taliban. Nonetheless, this involvement would likely come at a price, with Maulana Fazlur Rehman seeking a significant share in the future set-up and pro-TTP and Taliban elements gaining strength in the bordering regions with Afghanistan.

The Taliban, the maulana and his party share similar views on the TTP, favouring reconciliation with the militants. However, any attempt at reconciliation could have severe consequences for internal security, as evidenced during the PTI-led government’s attempt at peace with the militants. It allowed them to settle in KP, but according to a UN report, the returning TTP terrorists regrouped, instead of laying down arms, thus posing a greater threat to Pakistan’s security.

While the Taliban may influence some voters, their regime is also seen by many in Pakistan as a desirable model Islamic state. This narrative has serious implications for institutional stability and the state and society of the country, as Dr Akmal Hussain briefly discusses in his recent book, Pakistan, Institutional Instability and Underdevelopment. Ideological narratives that contradict state policies and social norms can distract state institutions, especially when they are used as cheap political tools.

Turning back the clock

Summary

  • Imran Khan's future:
    • The recent court verdicts suggest a "reset to 2016" with PML-N likely winning the upcoming elections.
    • If Khan wants to limit the establishment's influence, he'll need to build alliances with other parties.
  • Challenges for Khan:
    • He faces legal challenges and needs to appeal court verdicts against him.
    • His past policies might make it harder to gain allies.
  • Establishment's role:
    • They seem determined to weaken Khan after his alleged "coup attempt".
    • They prioritize economic stability and might back PML-N for that reason.
  • Nawaz Sharif's return:
    • If he wins, his commitment to democracy will be tested as he governs without establishment support.
    • Khan's supporters might see him as vindictive if he continues targeting Khan.
  • Importance of alliances:
    • No party is happy with the establishment's interference, but they often seek their help individually.
    • Achieving civilian supremacy requires cooperation among all major political parties.

Article

THREE court verdicts in one week on top of everything else should leave very little doubt in any mind that the ‘reset to 2016’ is being delivered, and by this time next week it will be clear whether or not the carefully crafted plan was successfully implemented.

The only outside chance, the slimmest if you like, of it failing will be on polling day. What if the rage of the supporters at what they see as injustice to their leader manifests itself in their voting in droves for the candidates endorsed by the party? How many votes can be tossed in the rubbish bin for one reason or another?

Given the sequence of events since Imran Khan’s falling out with his erstwhile backers and all the developments resulting from the crackdown on supporters after the May 9, 2023 folly, to the arrest, incarceration and sentencing of the leader, to the Supreme Court-endorsed ECP decision to leave the PTI bat-less on the ballot, there seems only one plausible scenario.

Yes, at this stage that, too, is no more than an educated guess but the wait isn’t too long now to see if the hypothesis is borne out by unfolding events. If it is, the PML-N will emerge as the winner and will be able to form a government, in all likelihood headed by Mian Nawaz Sharif.

If Imran Khan wishes to curtail the establishment’s role in politics, he would need to build bridges with potential allies.

For his part, the PTI leader will have to file and fight multiple appeals in superior courts against lower court verdicts jailing him, while also facing fresh prosecutions such as the one in the so-called Al Qadir Trust land deal where property tycoon Malik Riaz is alleged to have handed over a large tract of land to a trust managed by Imran Khan and his spouse in exchange for a £190 million favour.

The establishment’s rage over what was seen as a coup attempt on May 9 last year does not seem to be ebbing and it has pursued Imran Khan and his party with brutal vigour, which one estranged PML-N leader described as “worse than what we faced in 2018”.

Mr Sharif has long lamented about how his government was destabilised from 2016 onwards, and appeared to place the onus on the establishment to undo what it did then. Therefore, the crucial question is whether the reset to 2016 will also mean a continuation of the strong-arm methods used then and being utilised today.

This question is raised because these methods vitiate the political environment and have an adverse impact on the economy. The establishment has made it very clear that the economy is its top priority and that position is understandable in view of the end to the ‘war on terror’ dividend from the US.

Unless the economy stabilises and starts posting decent growth, the share in the cake of defence will also shrink. For now, the establishment and its current leader appear to have put all their faith in the PML-N and in Nawaz Sharif’s ability to steer the economy to safe shores and attain stable growth.

The signing of the Charter of Democracy with the PPP’s Benazir Bhutto in London ahead of the 2007-08 election marked a turning pointing in Mr Sharif’s politics. His travails since the 1999 coup threw him out of power and into prison and then forced him into a long exile seemed to have transformed him into a democrat.

From then on, he has by and large stood true to his new self, putting considerable distance between his politics of vendetta of the 1990s and his spirit of political accommodation which was underlined by the passage of the 18th Amendment as also the National Finance Commission award.

When he came into power in 2013, many of his party stalwarts from KP suggested that they form a provincial coalition government with allies, new and old, as that was numerically possible, but he flatly refused, saying the PTI, being the largest single party in the province, had the right to form the government.

If indeed he becomes the next prime minister, his democratic credentials will be tested soon after the government is formed, because the establishment will recede into the background and he will have to take the blame if the current state of play does not change for the PTI leader.

Even if the establishment continues to weigh in on matters to do with the PTI leader, in the popular perception, Imran Khan’s vindictive policies, while in government, will have reverse-transformed the PML-N leader into his past, ie, 1990s’ self.

In opposition, as in government, Imran Khan has had little time for other political parties that he has looked at with contempt. But if he truly wishes to curtail the establishment’s role in politics, which grew considerably during his tenure in office, he would need to bite the bullet and build bridges with potential allies.

And these potential allies will inevitably include all major political parties. None of them feels happy about the establishment’s overreach and yet most run to it for help when one of them breaks rank to secure establishment help or is propped up by it.

Much of the establishment overreach happens in this day and age thanks to the assistance of civilian (political) proxies. So, whether in government or opposition, political parties will need to understand that their aim of civilian supremacy can only be attained in concert with their own kind, ie, other political parties in parliament, and not by pandering to extra-parliamentary forces.

Yes, you’d be right in saying this columnist is jumping the gun and painting scenarios that the voter will shred to bits on Feb 8. That could happen. Political analysis, especially in our conditions, is not an exact science. One can only look at various possibilities and assign probabilities to each. I’d be happy to be proved wrong by the voter as that would be democracy at its best.

Fight to forgive

Summary

  • Forgiveness as a path to healing: The article highlights the story of Amy Biehl's parents who forgave their daughter's murderers and even hired two of them to work in their foundation. This act of forgiveness is seen as a powerful example of how reconciliation can lead to healing and progress.
  • Anger and resentment as roadblocks: The author argues that anger and resentment stemming from political and social issues are hindering Pakistan's progress. They emphasize the need to let go of these negative emotions and move towards forgiveness.
  • Challenges of forgiveness: The article acknowledges the difficulty of forgiveness, especially when there's no accountability or genuine apology. It questions who has the power to forgive and what can be deemed truly forgivable.
  • Importance of accountability and leadership: Forgiveness is seen as ineffective without accountability. The author urges leaders to take responsibility for past mistakes and work together for a better future.
  • Hope for the future: Despite the challenges, the article concludes with a message of hope, emphasizing the importance of striving for a better future where people can disagree without being disagreeable.

Article

COULD you forgive your daughter’s murderers, and then hire two of them to come work for the organisation set up in her name?

This is what Linda and Peter Biehl did in South Africa following the stoning and stabbing of their daughter Amy by a mob in Cape Town in 1993. Amy, then 26 and a Fulbright scholar, was helping educate previously disenfranchised voters ahead of the historic 1994 elections that would see Nelson Mandela become president. Four men were found guilty of Amy’s murder but they applied to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for amnesty. Amy’s parents, who attended the hearing, did not object to their release in 1998. Later, they met two of the murderers and then hired them to work in the foundation they created in Amy’s name to continue her dream of imagining a world where reconciliation was possible.

In September last year, the Amy Biehl Foundation marked 30 years since her murder at one of the schools they’ve built in Cape Town. Linda was there along with two of her daughter’s murderers, who continue to work with the foundation; one of them told the media his relationship with the Biehls allowed him to become the person he is today and also allowed him to forgive himself.

They have all shown what reconciliation looks like, and how it can extend to, and then allow, a community to move forward.

The challenge is to forgive the very people who caused the mistrust.

But getting there is a difficult process. In order to learn how to let go of hurt feelings, I have been practising alternative forms of therapy and reading ancient texts. We have much to learn from our elders.

The Buddhists, for example, say forgiveness ends suffering. It is ultimately for yourself, for your peace of mind, to let go of the pain you carry. Most religious teachings echo similar sentiments.

No one advocates holding on to anger unless they find gain in it, and that thinking is not beneficial for societies. I believe we, as a nation, desperately need to let go of anger, resentment and hurt caused by a myriad of leadership failings and mistrust.

The challenge is to forgive the very people or institutions that caused the mistrust in the first place. It is complicated, especially when no one is asking for forgiveness or, they are forced to say sorry to avoid punishment and then banished. This happens with one-time favoured groups who run afoul of the powerful; their ‘crime’ is a damnation until it is not, and then all is forgotten. This script is old and tiresome but there are too many players who happily acquiesce in going along as they gain power.

Forgiveness will not work without accountability. But who has the power to forgive? What is deemed forgivable?

Lucy Allais, a philosopher at Johns Hopkins University who studies forgiveness and punishment, told Vox in 2022 that “forgiveness is most fundamentally a release from blame and anger”.

There is certainly a lot of that in Pakistan right now and it is proving a stumbling block to our progress. The anger is both online and on the streets.

I watched a lot of folks share videos of journalists unable to contain their excitement at the disqualification of Nawaz Sharif in 2017.

The video of a reporter showing viewers the inside of the former prime minister’s fridge resurfaced as did the video of a journalist in a tub. ‘Do they feel shame now that Imran Khan has been convicted,’ screamed half of Twitter?

I don’t know what answer — or apology, if it came — could have pacified the outraged mob.

Does social media cause this anger or does it reveal it, as Allais herself asks. We’ve seen how quickly a mob comes together to ‘cancel’ people in social media trials. There is no room for atonement in the virtual world while in the real world, the judicial system seems to be failing people.

In this atmosphere, can one even talk of forgiveness and reconciliation? We are days away from elections whose results will be rejected by X percentage of the population. This is the self-perpetuating cycle that does not allow room for reconciliation. Those to blame can also offer a way out.

These stakeholders must reckon with their past and accept that the only way forward is to come together as leaders invested in Pakistan’s progress, with different ideas on how to get there. They can teach us how to disagree without being disagreeable.

People tend to assume the best of themselves and the worst of their opponents. “We need to see people as potentially better than the worst things they’ve done,” says Allais.

It is a tall ask but one worth attempting. We will eventually get it right. This hope is worth fighting for.

Securing borders

Summary

Pakistan's borders:

  • Threats: Facing challenges on both eastern (India) and western (Afghanistan, Iran) borders.
  • India: Accused of using assassins to kill Pakistanis and supporting terrorism.
  • Afghanistan: Taliban's release of TTP prisoners led to renewed attacks in Pakistan.
  • Iran: Cross-border attacks due to alleged presence of militant groups on both sides.

Security and foreign policy:

  • Review needed: Current policies haven't effectively addressed border issues.
  • New government: Opportunity to reassess and implement a "new agenda of peace".
  • Recommendations: Engage with neighbors, address internal causes of militancy.

Article

PAKISTAN’S national security has lately been under threat on its eastern as well as western borders. On the eastern frontier, India’s attitude towards Pakistan has unfortunately hit a new low. The Modi regime is constantly innovating prickly ways to assert its growing hubris in the neighbourhood and beyond. Its latest practice is to deploy assassins on foreign lands to kill so-called anti-India elements. The evidence shows that Indian intelligence operatives managed to have not only Mohammad Riaz and Shahid Latif assassinated on Pakistani soil, but many more Pakistani citizens too, for which investigations are underway. This is in line with what Indian operatives did in Canada and the US when they targeted Sikhs calling for an independent state of Khalistan.

Using assassins to kill on foreign soil is a variant of the earlier policy of sending in Indian operatives, such as Kulbhushan Jadhav, who would enter Pakistan under fake identities to destabilise the country. However, the cause of regional peace will not be served if India continues to commit state terrorism while accusing Pakistan of cross-border terrorism. Both countries would do well to eliminate transnational terrorism through cooperation rather than confrontation.

Pakistan’s western frontiers are also in the grip of cross-border terrorism. Last month, Iran attacked a target inside Pakistan, ostensibly to eliminate an alleged hideout of Jaish al-Adl, an anti-Iran Sunni militant group active in Sistan-Baluchestan. Pakistan responded with a strike against Baloch terrorist elements in the border town of Saravan. Both governments swiftly resolved the matter through diplomacy. But soon after, nine Pakistanis were murdered in Saravan. The Iranian foreign minister has since visited Pakistan to calm tensions. Ultimately, the root cause, which is the alleged presence of terrorist elements on both sides of the border, would need to be addressed to avert the recurrence of such incidents.

Ever since the Taliban came to power in Kabul in 2021, the TTP has been reinvigorated. The group had been beaten in operations in Swat, South Waziristan and North Waziristan as well as the countrywide intelligence-based operation Raddul Fasaad. The TTP’s resurgence resulted from the Afghan Taliban rulers’ release of TTP prisoners in the name of facilitating talks with Pakistan. A tentative ceasefire was agreed to, leading to senior TTP leaders being freed from prisons in Pakistan and the resettlement of hundreds of TTP fighters in the country.

A detailed review is needed of our security and foreign policies.

Instead of appreciating the gesture, the TTP used the opportunity to regroup and resume its attacks against targets in Pakistan, particularly the security forces. Despite this setback, Islamabad has, prudently, maintained its contacts with Kabul at multiple levels to stress that Afghanistan’s strategic interests would be better served if Kabul restricted the space given to the TTP for cross-border terrorism, and reoriented its policies to focus on peace and development.

Ever since the launch of CPEC in 2015, Pakistan’s detractors have tried to carry out acts of terrorism against Chinese nationals working on CPEC projects here. At the request of China, Pakistan’s steadfast friend, the government constituted a strong force to safeguard CPEC projects and Chinese nationals. This has improved the security situation, although occasional terrorist attacks still occur.

All this requires an in-depth review of our security and foreign policies. An opportunity will arise when a new government is elected this month. After holding consultations with think tanks, academia, and intelligentsia, the elected government must institute a mechanism to undertake such a review on a new agenda of peace that should be pursued with not only our neighbours but also other powers of relevance to Pakistan.

Recently, a national conference was convened in Islamabad by the Sanober Institute in collaboration with two partners from academia and the think tank community to prepare a strategy manifesto for the new government with recommendations for Pakistan’s security and foreign policies. Similar efforts are currently underway in several universities and think tanks, born of a desire to see our country achieve the glory that Pakistan’s founder had envisioned for it.

Based on the Quaid’s advice, and the imperative to stabilise its borders, Pakistan must address the internal and external reasons of militancy. Internally, militant, extremist, sectarian and sub-nationalist forces need to be dealt with politically first, and kinetically later if required. Externally, we should engage with all neighbours such that it builds their stakes in Pakistan’s stability. In the medium to long term, this approach can ensure border stability and progress.

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